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can mitigate these tendencies. For big ecology to result in 
great science, ecologists must become informed, aware and 
engaged in the advocacy and governance of large ecologi-
cal projects.
Keywords Project management · Systems engineering · 
National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON)
Introduction and motivation
Ecologists are increasingly concerned with big ques-
tions (Schimel et al. 2015b; Kreft and Jetz 2007). Ecolo-
gists may seek general theory or transferable manage-
ment recommendations and require data to extend their 
knowledge from a small number of detailed case studies 
to larger regions. Alternately, other ecologists, having dis-
cerned patterns in large but sparse data sets, seek confirma-
tion through large experiments, intensive measurements 
or rigorous sampling (Soranno and Schimel 2014). The 
challenges of a changing world require observations over 
time, and detection of changes requires experiments and 
observations that are dense in time and space. Ecologists 
interested in the interactions of ecosystems with the earth 
system need to be able to add up fluxes of carbon, water, 
energy or other constituents to quantify global budgets. 
All of these types of advances require adequate, and often 
very extensive, experimentation and infrastructure. These 
projects are of extraordinary importance and can lead to 
breakthroughs, either directly or by providing the connec-
tive tissue that allows linking separate projects together to 
produce an unanticipated result. There is an emerging liter-
ature in ecology around the conduct of larger programs, but 
little of it references the disciplines, mechanisms and for-
malisms required by projects with significant engineering, 
Abstract Ecologists are increasingly tackling questions 
that require significant infrastucture, large experiments, 
networks of observations, and complex data and computa-
tion. Key hypotheses in ecology increasingly require more 
investment, and larger data sets to be tested than can be 
collected by a single investigator’s or s group of investiga-
tor’s labs, sustained for longer than a typical grant. Large-
scale projects are expensive, so their scientific return on the 
investment has to justify the opportunity cost-the science 
foregone because resources were expended on a large pro-
ject rather than supporting a number of individual projects. 
In addition, their management must be accountable and 
efficient in the use of significant resources, requiring the 
use of formal systems engineering and project management 
to mitigate risk of failure. Mapping the scientific method 
into formal project management requires both scientists 
able to work in the context, and a project implementation 
team sensitive to the unique requirements of ecology. Spon-
soring agencies, under pressure from external and internal 
forces, experience many pressures that push them towards 
counterproductive project management but a scientific 
community aware and experienced in large project science 
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construction, data and computing components (Linden-
mayer and Likens 2010; Osmond et al. 2004).
These large science questions generate a common 
requirement, data, lots of it collected on scales that require 
resources outside the range available to even the best-
funded single principal investigator or group project. Col-
lecting data on these scales requires technology, logistics, 
collaboration, management and money. Because large-scale 
projects are expensive, their scientific return on the invest-
ment has to justify the opportunity cost–the research fore-
gone because resources were expended on a large project 
rather than supporting a number of individual projects. 
This conflict between the payoff from investment in infra-
structure and coordinated data collection versus funding 
small individual projects is faced by all disciplines, and is 
increasingly being faced by ecologists, a field populated by 
scientists who really prefer to be in the woods (or another 
favorite ecosystem) by themselves!
Every aspect of big ecology is challenging. Sponsors of 
research have to make extraordinary efforts to support large 
projects. These projects do not fit into normal budget enve-
lopes, and so have to compete with projects from other dis-
ciplines or be prioritized relative to smaller research grants. 
Some agencies and disciplines have regular budget lines for 
such activities, but even in that case, long-term maintenance 
and operations funding is required. While some disciplines 
have long experience with large projects, terrestrial ecol-
ogy has had limited support from large facilities or coordi-
nated programs. An exception to this comes from the NASA 
remote sensing programs, which however involved a rela-
tive small number of ecologists in the advocacy, design and 
implementation phases. As a result, there are relatively few 
ecologists in either the research or the funding agency com-
munities with deep experience in large project management. 
It is critical to share experience in the design, implementa-
tion and application of big science activities, in the context 
of ecology and to develop a larger community able to par-
ticipate in the development and management of big ecology.
This essay builds on the authors’ experience in big ecol-
ogy over several decades. We have served in a number of 
project roles including as members of executive commit-
tees for field campaigns, community modeling activities 
and satellite missions. We have held leadership roles as PI 
or project coordinator (ACME: Desai et al. 2014, VEMAP: 
Schimel et al. 2000), Project Scientist (CSMP: Kiehl and 
Gent 2004, LBA: Keller et al. 2004) and as Chief Scien-
tist (NEON: Keller et al. 2008), and served in other sci-
ence team roles on significant projects (FIFE: Sellers and 
Schimel 1993, EOS: Moore et al. 1996). We have also 
served as peer reviewers, project reviewers and as NRC 
committee members on large project-related activities. We 
base this paper on both positive experiences and lessons 
learned from our mistakes and failures.
Background, terminology and components
Large science projects, when they reach a certain critical 
size, tend to accumulate technical management apparatus. 
Ideally a big project is like any other research project—just 
bigger!—with a well-formulated question and rigorous 
methods.
Large-scale projects can be big experiments, with clear 
goals and hypotheses similar to smaller experiments, but 
requiring substantial engineering and investment. Other 
projects provide resources that are common elements 
of research for an entire area of inquiry. The distinction 
between large-scale experiments and general-purpose 
infrastructure is a continuum and not a dichotomy, but 
the management elements are largely common across 
the continuum. Building an oceanographic research ves-
sel is an example of infrastructure that can serve a wide 
range of purposes, but must still meet scientific needs. The 
most obvious terrestrial equivalent to a ship is a field sta-
tion, which can support research from genomics to bioge-
ochemistry, and stations too must meet the needs of their 
researchers. Other large projects are built around very 
specific hypotheses or questions, and have less of an infra-
structural character, but are really very large experiments, 
such as FACE projects (Norby 2005).
Successful project management for science research 
and infrastructure matches resources with questions, 
whether they are very general or highly specific; manage-
ment cannot be an end in itself. Science leadership defines 
goals, objectives, observables and products, and evalu-
ates whether the observables and products can adequately 
address the goals and objectives. In a common model, sci-
ence leadership is implemented through a Principal Inves-
tigator, an individual with knowledge and experience of 
the large-scale project’s goals, a Chief Scientist or Project 
Scientist, who provides science input to day-to-day deci-
sions, and a science team, funded and engaged individuals 
who provide specific technical expertise and are available 
to support more specific decisions. A large project may also 
have staff scientists, responsible for day-to-day design and 
implementation of protocols, algorithms and other tasks, 
and advisory groups to provide independent input.
Large science projects usually include two disciplines, 
systems engineering and project management, less famil-
iar to ecologists and university scientists in general. Sys-
tems engineering is an interdisciplinary field that focuses 
on how to design and manage complex systems. Systems 
engineering ensures that all dimensions of a project or sys-
tem are considered, and integrated into a whole. In a sci-
ence project, systems engineering formalizes the scientific 
process of ensuring a priori that the data collected are suf-
ficient to test the proposed hypotheses and while it involves 
a great deal of new terminology and process, it is nearly 
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equivalent to what scientists do for themselves on a smaller 
scale. Systems engineers also deal with process, the for-
mal translation of questions into requirements that can then 
guide implementation details, the reviews to ensure that the 
process remains on track, and the quantification of risk to 
enable managing cost risk.
The second discipline is project management. Project 
management is a discipline that on large projects trans-
lates the systems engineering framework (derived from the 
scientific requirements) into actionable and discrete tasks, 
the implementation of those tasks, and the monitoring of 
cost, schedule and risk. Project management is also usually 
responsible, together with financial managers, for reporting 
and accountability of the project schedule and budget to the 
sponsor—a responsibility not to be underestimated when 
large resources are in play.
In concept, the flow from science questions, to system 
requirements, to budget, schedule, and risk is a simple lin-
ear process (Fig. 1). In the real world, the flow does not 
really work this way. Grand ideas usually translate into 
excessive costs, impossible schedules, and/or unacceptable 
risks. The art (and joy and pain) of designing a large sci-
ence project is the iterative process that retains the kernel 
of the grand idea and translates it into a set of requirements 
fitting a reasonable cost-schedule-risk envelope (Fig. 2). 
This iterative process starts at the high level and works its 
way through project details sometimes bouncing back up to 
high levels when problems are uncovered.
Regardless of how beautifully a project is designed, the 
sponsor plays a crucial role. The sponsor is responsible 
for securing and retaining funds, usually in a government 
context. The sponsor, if these funds are of a magnitude 
large enough to be visible in a larger (agency, or legisla-
tive) context is subject to additional pressures that are real, 
serious and often orthogonal to scientific issues! Ideally, 
the team (agency personnel, project leadership) works 
together to ensure the science requirements are met, while 
satisfying the real-world requirements associated with the 
stewardship of large amounts of science funding—funds 
for which there are always many other worthy contenders.
Design
As noted above, the design of a large science project begins 
with a goal and question or questions. Goals may be quite 
specific, or broader, as in the National Ecological Obser-
vatory Network (NEON) Grand Challenge framework, 
designed to guide science over a 30 year project lifetime 
(see Table 1). An environmental science project is dis-
tinct from a monitoring system designed for environmen-
tal management. In the latter case, requirements are met if 
sufficient information is produced to trigger management 
actions as in the case of lake acidity measures or weather 
forecasts. Monitoring systems may support scientific 
research opportunistically but are not designed to detect 
unknown phenomena and enable scientific discovery.
Without the discipline of a question and hypotheses, 
there is no basis for prioritizing and making resource 
Fig. 1  The idealized elements of translating a scientific question into 
a project that answers the question. The left-hand column shows the 
flow from science into implementation, while the right-hand column 
shows the steps required. Systems engineering translates the sci-
ence questions into specific requirements to answer the questions, 
while project management translates meeting those requirements into 
cost, schedule, and risk
Fig. 2  The real-world iteration of project definition (Fig. 1) against 
resource constraints and sponsor tolerance for risk. Most projects 
begin with a planned scope that exceeds available resources or con-
tains unanticipated risk, which emerges during scientific and engi-
neering analysis. At the same time, it is common to discover that 
questions can be answered, or answered with acceptable uncer-
tainty, with less expensive approaches. When successful, this itera-
tion should identify the maximum science for the resources avail-
able. Alternately, this process may reveal that the question cannot 
be addressed with the resources available, and the funds are better 
invested in a different question
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decisions. Agreeing on a question creates conflict because 
different scientists have different interests. But without a 
compelling question, there is little basis for a design (see 
Lindenmeyer and Likens 2010 for an excellent and lengthy 
discussion of this issue). Goals or grand challenges are cru-
cial because, while they do not uniquely define the project, 
they create a boundary between what the project will and 
will not address (Table 1).
Once a goal is agreed to, specific questions, hypotheses 
or predictions that must be tested to answer the question are 
identified. This is an entirely familiar process to research-
ers. While managing a large project requires adhering to as 
much formalism as possible, science is a human endeavor 
and scientists have knowledge from experience that is 
impossible to prove within the formal framework. How-
ever, experience teaches us that well-designed experiments 
often pay off for far more than just the question they were 
designed around. This is not magic, but reflects the value 
of careful design, and the ability to quantify uncertainty in 
a well-designed study (enabling inference and quantifica-
tion of uncertainty, so that even if a design is not optimal, 
it is usable). There are many examples of this, from appli-
cations of satellite instruments like LANDSAT or MODIS 
to questions that were not even envisioned when they were 
built, to the fascinating new questions asked of large-scale 
experimental manipulations like those at the Cedar Creek 
LTER site (Tilman et al. 2006).
Questions take a project one step closer to a unique defi-
nition, because once a question is posed, the team can begin 
to define what it would take to answer the question. Just as 
with a goal, this may not lead to a unique answer. This is a 
crucial point: the high-level challenges and questions help 
define what a project will not address, but the design pro-
cess is needed to determine what can adequately address 
these questions. There is no magic formula for uniquely 
defining a project from its goals and questions. For exam-
ple, if we want to quantify the carbon budget of a forest, we 
could use eddy covariance and measure CO2 exchange, or 
we could measure carbon stocks over time. However, we 
can exclude and evaluate options. For example, if our goal 
is to measure the carbon budget of a forest using measure-
ments of carbon stocks, we know it is necessary but insuf-
ficient to measure only aboveground biomass, and irrel-
evant to describe pollination ecology of a particular species 
(although that could be useful ancillary data). The design 
process then determines an adequate and cost-effective way 
of answering the question and the designers must choose 
between the available options.
The questions used to frame the NASA’s Earth Observ-
ing System and NSF’s NEON projects are shown in 
Table 2. These questions do not uniquely define these pro-
grams but they provide a framework and a bit more detail 
than the goals alone. Most importantly, they provide a 
framework for identifying what is NOT included in the pro-
ject and so help define scope. Once questions are defined, 
measurements adequate to answer them must be identified. 
In the case of the NEON questions (Table 2), the mean-
ing of “continental-scale ecology” is defined by the goals 
(Table 1) as measurements of biogeochemistry, biodiver-
sity, ecohydrology and infectious disease. The NEON com-
munity then had to iterate specific measurements in each 
category sufficient to define change, a process that required 
Table 1  NEON grand challenges
The NEON grand challenges, a set of science areas broad enough for 
a 30-year agenda but specific enough that they define what can be in 
the program, and what lies outside it
Drivers of ecological change Responses to ecological change
Climate change Biogeochemistry
Land use change Biodiversity
Invasive species Ecohydrology
Infectious disease
Table 2  Example science questions for two large science projects
The high-level science questions for two big environmental science projects. Such questions further refine the needed measurements, and focus 
the effort. While science questions do not uniquely define what will be measured, they aid the design process but defining what the project is not 
responsible for
NASA’s Earth Observing System Science Questions  
(Moore et al. 1991)
The National Ecological Observatory’s Science Questions  
(Schimel et al. 2011)
How are water and energy cycle changing? What are the impacts of climate change on continental-scale ecology?
How are the oceans changing What are the impacts of land use change on continental-scale ecology
How is tropospheric chemistry changing? What are the effects of invasive species on continental-scale ecology?
How are land surface hydrology and ecology changing? What are the interactive effects of climate, land use and invasives on 
continental-scale ecology?
How is stratospheric chemistry changing? How do the transport and mobility of energy, matter and organisms 
affect continental-scale ecology?
How is solid earth changing?
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several years, hundreds of scientists and significant statisti-
cal analysis (Schimel et al. 2011).
The hypotheses and questions, and the data needed 
to answer them form the basis for system requirements 
(Fig. 1). Requirements define the minimum performance 
a system must achieve in order to meet the project goals. 
Requirements must be realistic, and considerable expe-
rience shows that the more investment and care put into 
requirements, the more likely is project success. The dis-
cipline of translating scientific inquiry into requirements is 
difficult, and in some cases, must be approximate, and is 
always easier for incremental than transformative research. 
However, the definition and then the maintenance of 
requirements as projects progress and challenges arise is 
the most important and difficult responsibility of a project’s 
scientific leadership. Without strong, requirements-based 
leadership, a project can only succeed by chance (NRC 
2006). Numerous reports emphasize the risk to project per-
formance that arises from inadequate cost estimation (NRC 
2005). Definition and adherence to science requirements is 
essential for cost definition and control (NRC 2006, 2010).
Management of scope, responding to budget reductions, 
unforeseen cost increases or unexpected risk, are amongst 
the most challenging dimensions of large project manage-
ment. However, just as most PIs revise their research plans 
as they begin to implement the experiment they proposed, 
most large projects go through a certain number of scope 
changes, either during the design process or as implemen-
tation reveals unexpected difficulties (Fig. 2). For example, 
during the NEON design process, a traditional ecosystem 
ecology measurement that had long been planned presented 
unexpected challenges when scaled to the entire network. 
Soil-atmosphere respiration is a key ecosystem flux for 
carbon that arises from the combined activities of below-
ground organisms including roots, the rhizosphere, and the 
broad community of decomposers. This measurement is so 
common that automated commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
systems were available for purchase although the initial 
cost estimate for commercial systems was relatively high 
when implemented across the full observatory design. Even 
the refined commercial systems require substantial on-site 
maintenance (for example to remove fallen twigs and leaves 
that prevent chamber closure) and are difficult or impossible 
to operate in the snow. Removal of chambers in the autumn 
and replacement in the spring was an additional and mean-
ingful operational cost. The requirement for maintenance 
translates into high operations costs and risks. Based on the 
estimated costs and risks, a redundant, albeit less thoroughly 
tested approach based on estimation of fluxes from soil CO2 
profiles was retained while chambers were discarded. This 
type of decision-making is routine in large projects but 
requires the collaboration of all disciplines (science, project 
management, systems engineering) to succeed.
A larger example of a scope change is reported in Moore 
et al. (1991), describing the redesign of NASA’s Earth 
Observing System following a series of budget revisions. 
The redesign was led by the mission’s science team (called 
the Payload Panel), supported by the instrument principal 
investigators and coordinated by mission project manage-
ment and systems engineering teams. The process began 
by reviewing the science goals and key observations, and 
prioritizing them, based in part on contemporary climate 
uncertainties defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Instruments were grouped against those 
science goals and evaluated both for their separate and 
synergistic contributions. This process of definition and 
grouping is described in a series of tables in the Moore 
et al. (1991) article. This information, in conjunction with 
cost and schedule information provided by project manage-
ment was used to prioritize instruments, and design a mis-
sion profile that fit within the cost envelope. This required 
a detailed knowledge of the science questions and a clear 
understanding of what each measurement contributed. One 
instrument, a hyperspectral imager, was deferred, even 
though it would measure important properties, because its 
field of view was so limited that the amount of data col-
lected would be modest, and obtained at high cost. A 
second instrument, a synthetic aperture radar, was also 
deferred because it required a separate satellite platform 
and had very high costs. The eventual solution preserved 
most of the missions’ science requirements while signifi-
cantly reducing cost and cost risk on several challenging 
sensors.
Certain aspects of design are distinctive to ecological 
projects and less familiar to other disciplines. In ecological 
studies, requirements for accuracy and precision are often 
largely determined by the statistical sampling and not by 
the intrinsic accuracy and precision of an instrument, 
although there are exceptions (for example in flux or iso-
topic measurements, e.g., Loescher et al. 2006). Ecologists 
are masters of sampling design at relatively small scales (a 
site: 100 m2 to 10 km2 or so) but have relied mostly on ad 
hoc networks to address larger scales (but see Keller et al. 
2008). Increasingly the literature shows that relying on 
even very large sets of ad hoc measurements is problem-
atic. For example Saatchi et al. (2015) show that even large 
numbers of non-random forest inventory plots produce sys-
tematically biased estimates and Schimel et al. (2015a, b) 
shows that biased global sampling contaminates estimates 
of carbon fluxes, carbon stocks and plant functional diver-
sity. A major aspect of the design of large-scale ecological 
studies must be based on analysis and modeling of existing 
data to build a viable sampling design, rather than assembly 
bottom-up and hopeful reliance on the central limit theo-
rem—an approach that may work but is not ensured (Jung 
et al. 2009). Sampling designs define where measurements 
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are made, how many measurements are made, replication 
of manipulations and other crucial aspects of determining 
whether a question can be answered, and the domain of 
ecological variation within which that answer will be valid, 
all key criteria for the scientific value of a study.
The European Space agency has developed a mission 
to observe forest biomass from space, using a radar instru-
ment called BIOMASS (Table 3). BIOMASS is specifi-
cally designed to reduce the sort of uncertainty described in 
Saatchi et al. (2015), as can be seen in its mission require-
ments, which are the next level of detail after scientific 
goals and questions have been identified. For example, 
issues of sample adequacy are addressed by very specific 
requirements for spatial resolution, accuracy and coverage 
(Table 3). The mission requirements for BIOMASS are suf-
ficient to show that the experiment can significantly reduce 
current uncertainty, addressing the quantification goal, and 
are sufficiently accurate to test hypotheses about the role of 
disturbance and biomass levels, amongst others.
While the accuracy of ecological measurements is often 
not the most limiting aspect of uncertainty, inconsistency 
among measurements made at different times or places can 
cripple subsequent analysis. Ensuring consistency through 
calibration and validation is essential to linking disparate 
measurements in time and space to enable data analysis 
over broader scales than in the context of a single investi-
gator’s project. Consistency is critical for the legacy of a 
data set and its use in detecting trends in time or space, an 
issue of growing concern. Referring back to Table 3, above, 
high-level mission requirements like 20 % accuracy imply 
lower-level requirements for calibration and validation suf-
ficient to achieve and document that accuracy. Ensuring 
consistency across large regions-continents to the globe-
and over years or decades may require huge effort and ded-
icated scientific expertise (Keeling 1998; Harris 2010) and 
is not a familiar effort for many ecologists. For many eco-
logical measurements the standards and protocols are not 
in place in the community to even enable calibration and 
validation, and this is an important challenge.
Implementation
The implementation of a large project requires a wide 
range of skills and disciplines, whose exact composition 
of course depends on the nature of the project and will be 
entirely different between an organismal sampling network, 
a sensor network or a remote sensing satellite. Despite this, 
there are some consistent challenges that most projects 
face. Most projects must confront mismatch between the 
desired scope and the available resources. Generally, the 
scope is larger than the resources support and so scien-
tific and project leadership must iterate changes to science 
scope against the resource requirements of each poten-
tial configuration (Fig. 2). Balancing scope against avail-
able resources requires a deep understanding of the project 
requirements, how they arise from the underlying scientific 
questions, and how the questions arose in the scientific 
community. This requires scientific leadership that both 
understands the science and is realistic about resources. 
The flip side is that project management must acknowledge 
the scientific requirements and collaborate to trace require-
ments to cost, so that collaborative decisions can be made 
when scope must be modified.
Project management and science leadership must have 
a strong and balanced relationship. The dialogue whether 
about existential issues or minor modifications is intrinsi-
cally conflictual, and while a collegial and cooperative 
decision-making style is effective, the best outcomes arise 
from the creative tension between scientific leadership’s 
insight into the research and project management’s insights 
into resources and constraints. In this dialectic, systems 
engineering enables the dialogue by ensuring that the con-
nections between all the aspects of the complex project are 
understood, so that scientific and resource impacts can be 
linked. Systems engineering also acts as a referee, and sets 
the rules of such a discussion.
Good project management requires not only good pro-
cess and formalism to provide quantitative information to 
support decisions; it also requires attention to human rela-
tionships, the people issues. An excessive focus on process 
rather than outcomes provides the appearance of account-
ability and oversight, without adding significant value to 
the project and is considered a significant risk (NRC 2006). 
Table 3  Example mission requirements
A representative set of high-level ecological mission requirements. 
These requirements are the outcome of a design and formulation 
activity and define the extent, accuracy and precision of measure-
ments to answer specific questions
European Space Agency BIOMASS mission requirements. BIO-
MASS is a P-Band synthetic aperture radar whose goal is improved 
understanding and quantification of the land contribution to the global 
carbon cycle and whose objectives are to quantify aboveground bio-
mass, forest disturbance and inundation, all factors influencing the 
land carbon cycle http://esamultimedia.esa.int/docs/EarthObserva-
tion/BIOMASS_sheet_130611.pdf
Information product Mission requirements
Forest biomass  
(above ground)
20 % accuracy
100–300 m resolution/16 looks
2 Biomass maps/year
Polarimetric interferometric mode
Global coverage of forests
Forest disturbance Maps of disturbed area with 10 % classifica-
tion accuracy100 m resolution/16 looks
1–2 Forest disturbance maps every 2 months
Global coverage
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Risk management requires clear communication and well-
informed decision-making: process supports but does not 
replace commitment and insight. This depends more on 
trust, open communication and values than formal report-
ing mechanisms.
The various leaders of the project team (management, 
science, systems engineering) must be peers when they 
debate difficult and contentious issues such as project scope 
reductions, because these decisions must respect the scien-
tific and the financial integrity of the project. Project lead-
ership must have a balanced knowledge of their project and 
the ability and openness to learn quickly. If project leader-
ship cannot resolve conflict, then the entire team fails and 
corrective action may be required because the first require-
ment of this team is an ability to make decisions based on 
their different spheres of expertise.
Many sponsors and project managers feel that scien-
tific communities, which are egalitarian, somewhat anar-
chic and often self-serving, cannot make hard decisions. 
Funders, under pressure from budget and oversight groups, 
increasingly must also respond to pressures regarding man-
agement of large and expensive project. In their efforts to 
reduce risk, they adopt practices that may increase the risk 
of failure. Perceived risk often produces counterproduc-
tive activities that seem justified by a pressing problem, but 
increases long-term risk: the best counter to this is a clear 
statement of best practice as a positive goal (NRC 2005).
Despite the inevitable tension between the various par-
ties to a large project, every successful principal investi-
gator has had to make draconic decisions, and in fact, sci-
entific communities, which own project requirements can 
make difficult decisions if well-led and have the unique 
knowledge, when supported by project management, 
systems engineering and engineering to identify where 
requirements may be altered while retaining the maximum 
scientific value. While scientists can be unruly and undis-
ciplined—anathema to project management—they are also 
realists and capable of very creative and difficult decisions 
when well-led and well-informed.
Overly top-down and authoritarian management cre-
ates an environment for catastrophic failure, especially 
when combined with mutual distrust. One of the most 
important examples is the “Challenger Effect”, named for 
the circumstances surrounding the loss of the space shut-
tle Challenger. Investigations after the tragedy showed key 
information was not effectively shared as a result of man-
agement culture, both between NASA and its contractor 
and within NASA’s Center management (Vaughn 1996). In 
a stressful management situation, there is a natural human 
tendency to implement hierarchical and highly account-
able management structures. A risk in hierarchical systems 
is that subordinates fear passing bad news up the manage-
ment hierarchy and for management to discount new and 
contrary information. Adversarial relationships between a 
project and its sponsor can likewise impede the discussion 
of critical information. This is especially serious if manage-
ment or the sponsor perceives bad news as failure and is 
punitive or critical. Richard Feynman concluded that the 
Challenger disaster resulted from “engineers and manag-
ers who were not communicating effectively” (Feynman 
1988).
While the Challenger incident was an engineering fail-
ure, cultural elements contributed that apply equally to 
science projects. The Challenger Accident Investigation 
Report found that “cultural mandates for business-like effi-
ciency, production pressures, allegiance to hierarchy, and 
rule-following” were significant contributory factors to the 
incident (Vaughn 1996). All of these cultural attributes can 
easily develop, and in context, can seem reasonable. How-
ever, the outcome of these factors is pressure against open 
communication, flexibility and initiative. Because the cul-
tural mandates listed above are common in organizational 
settings, it follows that active measures must be taken to 
enhance communication across organizational levels, have 
in place adequate independent review to ensure that “pro-
duction pressures” and the desire for “business-like effi-
ciency” do not undermine effective decision-making (Presi-
dential Commission 1986).
Good project management encourages communication, 
rewards junior staff for voicing concerns and encourages 
managers to accept concerns as a positive development. 
Sponsors should similarly view problems identified by the 
project in a positive light, since problems identified early 
are almost always easier and cheaper to correct. When 
project participants fear to report challenges, problems 
grow, costs grow and failure is more likely. While a chain 
of accountability is crucial, flatter organizations with open 
communication are far less likely to conceal problems and 
risk serious failure. Successful management of complex, 
multidisciplinary projects comes from a commitment by 
peer leaders in the key disciplines to success and conflict 
resolution, rather than an organizational chart and chain of 
command that appears to enable executive decision mak-
ing (see Fig. 3 for examples of alternative project organiza-
tional structures).
Transparency to the user community is an important 
method of avoiding risk: while dealing with criticism from 
the community of potential users may be painful, is often 
time-consuming, and can even be disruptive, transparency 
and responsiveness leads to long-term support and enthu-
siasm for a project. This is crucial for sustaining support 
of a project once built. Again, it is better to identify issues 
early, have time to investigate and respond, than to be 
caught short late in a project where not only are problems 
more serious, but the perception of concealment erodes 
trust. Trust is a crucial commodity when a project depends 
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for its long-term execution on its scientific community’s 
support. Transparency is difficult for many sponsors for 
whom control of information becomes part of strategy for 
managing political or bureaucratic risks, or who represent 
organizations whose size, specialization and social distance 
between members makes sharing information difficult 
(What Vaughn 1996 calls “structural secrecy”), but this ten-
dency should be resisted to the extent possible.
Lessons learned
Big projects are a big deal and scientific communities, 
when they identify challenges which warrant the invest-
ment of significant resources, must take the stewardship 
of these resources with the utmost seriousness. Sponsor-
ing agencies must respect the commitment of the scientific 
community and understand their interests in a project. The 
scientific community, when asking and receiving politically 
visible sums of money must likewise respect the difficult 
political and bureaucratic environment their sponsors expe-
rience, and appreciate the behind-the-scenes and perhaps of 
necessity invisible efforts made on their behalf!
Leadership and collaboration across the scientific, tech-
nical and enabling disciplines within a project are crucial. 
While it is easy to adopt a rigid and hierarchical model to 
ensure control, this maximizes the risk of serious failure 
due to staff protecting information to assert control, con-
cealing risks out of fear of punishment and eroding trust 
with stakeholder communities. While micromanagement 
is a natural response to perceived risk, it almost always 
causes delay and increased cost (NRC 2005). Management 
by fear, often confused by all parties as being tough in 
addition to reducing morale, creates very real project risks 
and increases the possibility of failure.
Requirements definition is the step in a project where the 
adequacy of the proposed study to meet its scientific goals 
is assessed. Good requirements lead to good science, are the 
foundation of accurate cost estimation and allow scope adjust-
ments. Requirements are the bridge between science and all 
of the other project disciplines. Ownership of the require-
ments must rest with the science function, which must have 
sufficient independence, knowledge, expertise and authority 
to maintain, and if need be, negotiate changing requirements 
with other project groups. Project management owns the 
resources and has the responsibility to remain within budget 
and schedule. Systems engineering must own the process for 
changing requirements to enable science return on investment 
and total resources available to be reconciled. Ecologists must 
learn the skills to work within this formalism.
Project management and scientific leadership are by 
design in conflict, and this can lead to the best outcome 
through healthy debate. Enabling this debate requires 
underlying respect between the parties, clear rules and 
accurate information resulting from strong systems engi-
neering. The leadership team must recognize that failure to 
achieve a decision will result in consequences for the entire 
leadership team. If the leaders are not peers, and so equally 
accountable for failure, then the motivation to reach a con-
structive decision is lessened.
Fig. 3  Two project management models. a Is typical for a competi-
tively selected project, often of intermediate size. b Is more common 
for large, complex or infrastructure projects where a high degree of 
management experience is needed because of cost and complexity. In 
b, the role of the science team is to define and manage the science 
requirements and to ensure that scope changes are consistent with sci-
entific outcomes. Science teams are often competitively selected and 
funded independently by the sponsor to ensure independence
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Ecological uncertainty is often dominated by statistical 
sampling design in time and space, rather than by meas-
urement accuracy and precision, and so differs from the 
dominant components of uncertainty faced in other scien-
tific fields. The broad spatial scales, and long time scales 
of ecological change also impose challenging require-
ments for standardization and calibration to enable com-
parative analysis over vast areas and time spans. Eco-
logical projects must adequately address the twin design 
issues of sampling and standardization across diverse 
landscapes.
The big questions of ecology, biogeography, biodiver-
sity, the carbon cycle, the movement of invasive species, the 
functioning of whole watersheds, and the science broadly 
underlying sustainability increasingly require more data 
than a typical lab can collect on their own. This implies 
infrastructure, informatics, calibration and standardization 
and a degree of effort sometimes unfamiliar and perhaps 
even unwelcome to ecologists. This has implications for 
culture, rewards and training for ecologists. While many 
of the recommendations in this paper are commonsensical, 
they are not universally accepted and are easily abandoned 
in the stressful and pressured environment that inevitably 
accompanies large projects.
Perhaps the single hardest lesson to learn in the execu-
tion of large projects is a certain tolerance of risk and 
failure. Large projects entail risk as they involve doing 
things never done before, and often at scales never before 
attempted. Large projects always involve some degree of 
failure and the skill of the team shows in how they recover 
from these failures. The Hubble telescope correction is an 
example of this, and the recent re-boot of the Kepler mis-
sion. While project management and systems engineering 
controls risk, too much effort to avoid risk and failure, as 
documented above can lead to catastrophic failure. Despite 
all of these challenges, large investments are required for 
the success of ecology, and to enable sustaining ecosystems 
in a changing world.
Author contribution statement David Schimel and 
Michael Keller contributed equally to all aspects of this 
paper.
Acknowledgments We offer these insights to our Israeli colleagues 
as they contemplate a national network, the occasion for this special 
issue and to the broader community. We dedicate this to the dedi-
cated community of NEON staff members, advisory group members 
and alumni. The research carried out at the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory, California Institute of Technology, was under a contract with 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Copyright 2014 
California Institute of Technology. We thank all the colleagues, too 
many to mention, through whose efforts over many years, many 
projects have been not only spectacular scientifically but personally 
rewarding for us.
References
Desai AR, Moore DJP, Ahue W, Wilkes PTV, De Wekker S, Brooks 
BG, Campos T, Stephens BB, Monson RK, Burns S, Quaife T, 
Aulenbach S, Schimel DS (2011) Seasonal patterns of regional 
carbon balance in the central Rocky Mountains. J Geophys Res 
116:G04009. doi:10.1029/2011JG001655
Feynman RP, Richard P (1988) What do you care what other people 
think?. W W Norton, New York
Harris DC (2010) Charles David Keeling and the story of atmospheric 
CO2 measurements. Anal Chem 82(19):7865–7870
Jung M, Reichstein M, Margolis HA, Cescatti A, Richardson AD, 
Arain MA et al (2011) Global patterns of land‐atmosphere fluxes 
of carbon dioxide, latent heat, and sensible heat derived from 
eddy covariance, satellite, and meteorological observations. J 
Geophys Res 116(G3):G00J07. doi:10.1029/2010JG001566
Keeling CD (1998) Rewards and penalties of monitoring the earth. 
Ann Rev Environ 23:25–82
Keller M, Alencar A, Asner GP, Braswell B, Bustamante M, David-
son E, Feldpausch T, Fernandes E, Goulden M, Kabat P, Kruijt 
B, Luizão F, Miller S, Markewitz D, Nobre AD, Nobre CA, Filho 
NP, da Rocha HR, Dias PS, von Randow C, Vourlitis GL (2004) 
Ecological research in the large-scale biosphere-atmosphereex-
periment in Amazonia (LBA): Early results. Ecol Appl 14:S3–
S16. doi:10.1890/03-6003
Keller M, David SS, William WH, Forrest MH (2008) A continental 
strategy for the National Ecological Observatory Network. Front 
Ecol Environ 6:282–284
Kiehl JT, Gent PR (2004) The community climate system model. Vers 
Two J Clim 17:3666–3682
Kreft H, Jetz W (2007) Global patterns and determinants of vascu-
lar plant diversity. Proc Natl Acad Sci 104(14):5925–5930. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0608361104
Lindenmeyer D, Likens GE (2010) Effective ecological monitoring. 
CSIRO Press, Collingwood, Aus 170 pp
Loescher HW, Law BE, Mahrt L, Hollinger DY, Campbell J, Wofsy 
SC (2006) Uncertainties in, and interpretation of, carbon flux 
estimates using the eddy covariance technique. J Geophys Res 
111:D21S90. doi:10.1029/2005JD006932
Moore BM III, Dozier J, Abbott MA, Butler DM, Schimel DS, Schoe-
berl (1991) The restructured. earth observing. system: instrument 
recommendations. Eos 72(46):505–510
National Research Council (NRC) (2005) The owner’s role in project 
risk management. The National Academies Press, Washington, 
DC
National Research Council (NRC) (2010) Controlling cost growth 
of NASA Earth and space science missions. The National Acad-
emies Press, Washington, DC
Norby RJ et al (2005) Forest response to elevated CO2 is con-
served across a broad range of productivity. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
102:18052–18056
NRC (2006) http://science.energy.gov/~/media/opa/pdf/processes-
and-procedures/NLIC-Report-on-SC.pdf
Osmond B, Ananyev G, Berry J, Langdon C, Kolber Z, Lin G, Mon-
son R, Nichol C, Rascher U, Schurr U, Smith S, Yakir D (2004) 
Changing the way we think about global change research: scal-
ing up in experimental ecosystem science. Glob Change Biol 
10:393–407. doi:10.1111/j.1529-8817.2003.00747.x
Presidential commission on the space shuttle challenger accident 
(1986) http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm
Saatchi S, Joseph M, Liang Xu, Michael K, Yan Y, Fernando ES, 
Alessandro B (2015) Seeing the forest beyond the trees. Glob 
Ecol Biogeogr. doi:10.1111/geb.12256
Schimel D, Keller M, Berukoff S, Kao B, Loescher H, Powell H, 
Kampe T, Moore D, Gram W (2011) NEON 2011 science 
Author's personal copy
 Oecologia
1 3
strategy: enabling continental scale ecological forecasting. 2nd 
edn. NEON Inc, Boulder, Colorado. http://www.neoninc.org/
sites/default/files/basic-page-files/NEON_Strategy_2011u2_0.pdf
Schimel D, Pavlick R, Fisher JB, Asner GP, Saatchi S, Townsend P, 
Miller C, Frankenberg C, Hibbard K, Cox P (2015a) Observing 
terrestrial ecosystems and the carbon cycle from space. Glob 
Change Biol. doi:10.1111/gcb.12822
Schimel DS, Stephens BB, Fisher JB (2015b) The effect of increas-
ing CO2 on the terrestrial carbon cycle. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
112(2):436–441
Schimel D, Melillo J, Tian H, McGuire AD, Kicklighter D, Kittel 
T, Rosenbloom N, Running S, Thornton P, Ojima D, Parton W, 
Kelly R, Sykes M, Neilson R, Rizzo B (2000) Contribution of 
increasing CO2 and climate to carbon storage by ecosystems in 
the United States. Science 287:2004–2006
Sellers P, Schimel DS (1993) Remote sensing of the land biosphere 
and biogeochemistry in the EOS era: science priorities, methods 
and implementation—EOS land biosphere and biogeochemical 
cycles panels. Glob Planet Change 7:279–297
Soranno PA, Schimel DS (2014) Macrosystems ecology: big data, big 
ecology. Front Ecol Environ 12(1):3
Tilman D, Hill J, Lehman C (2006) Carbon-negative biofuels from low-
input high-diversity grassland biomass. Science 314:1598–1600
Vaughn D (1996) The challenger launch decision. University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago
Author's personal copy
